Wherein Lies the Power? Lobbyists and Lobbying Organizations in North Carolina by Scott, John C & Summerlin-Long, Jeff
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
OpenSIUC
2010 Conference Proceedings
2010
Wherein Lies the Power? Lobbyists and Lobbying
Organizations in North Carolina
John C. Scott
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, jcscott@email.unc.edu
Jeff Summerlin-Long
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, summerlinlong@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2010
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Conference Proceedings at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2010 by an
authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact opensiuc@lib.siu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Scott, John C. and Summerlin-Long, Jeff, "Wherein Lies the Power? Lobbyists and Lobbying Organizations in North Carolina"
(2010). 2010. Paper 30.
http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2010/30
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wherein Lies the Power? Lobbyists and Lobbying Organizations in North Carolina 
 
 
 
 
 
John C. Scott, JD, PhD 
Department of Public Policy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
 
 Jeff Summerlin-Long, JD  
Department of Public Policy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
 
 
 
A Paper Presented at the 2010 Duke Political Networks Conference 
Durham, NC 
May 20, 2010 
 
 
Abstract:  Using multilevel social network and standard statistical analysis, this paper compares 
three levels of a state-level lobbying network - the network of individual lobbyists, the network 
of lobbying organizations, and the client or principal network - in order to provide a more 
nuanced understanding of the structure and dynamics of state-level interest groups.  North 
Carolina is unusual in that it provides public longitudinal data since 1993 covering all three 
levels of relations. By engaging in this comparison, we hope to further parse the key 
characteristics of the network in order to understand its evolving structure. Specifically, how do 
different levels of the lobbying network evolve and change?  How do key network 
characteristics differ across network levels?  How are changing connections over time between 
lobbyists, lobbying organizations, and their clients associated with key political variables such as 
perceived influence?   
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Introduction and Overview   
Using a unique longitudinal dataset, this project is focused on the structure and evolution of 
lobbying networks at the state level.  We use the data from 1993 on lobbying organizations in 
the State of North Carolina as a case study.  Examining the structure of lobbying relationships in 
North Carolina in terms of different levels of lobbyist relations, this project assesses whether 
and how political networks change and whether different levels of lobbying relationships 
exhibit different characteristics.   
We study three levels of relationships within the interest group community, from the level 
of individual lobbyists to lobbying organizations to principals who hire individual and 
organizational lobbyists.  Our overall focus is not confined to one level (e.g., principal networks 
that are affiliations through common lobbying organizations) but to relations that span levels 
such as when principals employ individual lobbyists.  Within and across these levels we are 
interested in relations change and how patterns of relations matter for political activity. 
While the ostensible topic concerns state level lobbying, this paper is also about structure 
and time.  If social network methods permit us to take a relational view of political life, then we 
have to ask questions such as: What does the structure of relations look like?  And more 
importantly, what does it mean for political activity?  In addressing these questions, we have to 
consider the role of time.  Relationships build over time as actors interact and develop trust, 
norms, and common perspectives. So in this paper, we are concerned not just with the 
presence or absence of relations among lobbying entities, but also with the explanations and 
interpretations of such relations.   
This paper begins by providing a review of prior research, and the review has two foci. First, 
we begin by reviewing the state of the literature on political activity at the state and local level, 
particularly the interrelationships among interest groups across jurisdictions. Second, we 
summarize prior political work from a social network perspective, which provides a rationale for 
examining politics from a relational perspective.  The review of prior literature provides a 
foundation for our arguments, which suggest that lobbying communities are dynamic and that 
lobbying entities develop relations as a function of this dynamic process.  After a discussion of 
the data sources and methods, we present our results from descriptive social network analysis 
and dynamic modeling analysis. We conclude this paper by discussing future work and 
extensions as well as connecting this project to the concept of political influence. 
 
Prior Research 
State-Level Lobbying   
The structure of political activity has been a focus of social scientists for at least a couple of 
decades (Laumann and Knoke 1987).  However, as Baumgartner and Leech (1998) noted, little 
work has been done at the state level.  This project is not only focused on the state level but 
also on relations between local and national firms.  To the best of our knowledge, little research 
has explored the connections between interest groups represented at both the national and 
state levels.   
Wolak, Newmark, McNoldy, Lowery, and Gray (2002) created a dataset of state-level 
lobbying registrations across all 50 states in 1997.  They found that while the lobbying 
techniques show some convergence, communities of special interest groups remain 
predominantly local.  Similarly, de Figueiredo (2004a and b) and Boehmke (2008) model the 
3 
 
variations of state-level interest group activity.  In Boehmke’s (2008) study, he notes that states 
that permit direct initiatives have significantly larger interest group populations.  Evidence 
supports the proposed mechanism that state-level initiatives generate mobilization of 
previously dormant groups, which are usually local in nature.  This result might obtain because 
initiatives are typically state-specific, they foster larger interest group communities that create 
openings for niche groups, and as initiatives typically create groups with a short-term focus, 
higher rates of group exit create openings for new groups. 
However, recent research suggests significant linkages between the federal and state levels.  
Baumgartner, Gray, and Lowery (2009) model how federal policy activity stimulates lobbying 
activity in the states, and their analysis finds that “strong linkages exist between federal policy 
activities and the subsequent activities of groups in the states” (2009: 13).  They document that 
the pathways that connect federal and state-level policy activity are many and distinct. For 
example, they find evidence that federal and state policy actors are responding 
contemporaneously and directly to ongoing events. They also find a substitution effect in which 
congressional hearings in one year dampen or stimulate state lobbying registrations in another 
year, the effect of dampening or stimulation depending both on the kind of state legislature 
and policy area.  However, the “precise mechanisms and timing associated with these factors 
should be the object of further research” (2009: 13). 
Gray and Lowery (1996) have used a population ecology framework to measure and model 
the growth and development of interest group communities at the state level.  Two ideas from 
the population ecology literature are especially relevant: the density of interest group 
communities and the diversity of such communities. These concepts are best addressed 
through the use of network theory and analysis. 
 
Networks   
Social network theory and analysis has a long tradition in political research.  For example, 
the resource mobilization approach uses the patterned links among interest groups to show the 
structure coalitions, cleavages, and competitive relations among such groups and how political 
actors are linked to resources (Laumann and Knoke 1987; Wellman 1988; Knoke 1990).  Other 
political scientists have recognized the value of stable relationships in policymaking. For 
example, lobbying groups that have a long tenure or track record are often successful with 
bureaucratic lobbying because such a group will likely be of use to the agency in the future 
(Costain, 1978).
1
 Informal social relationships in lobbying exist and can serve useful ends 
(Chubb, 1983; Milbrath, 1963). However, the political science literature generally has not 
explored the mechanisms and implications of social relationships and social norms among 
lobbyists. Instead the models used in political science either have an undue reliance on 
structure, such as through the ‘iron triangle’ or subgovernment model, or view political actors 
as atomistic in nature (Lowi, 1969; Heclo, 1978; Heinz et al., 1993; Hula, 1999). 
In contrast, a relational perspective stressing social network analysis may be useful in 
getting at social reality in “dynamic, continuous, and processual terms” (Emirbayer, 1997: 281). 
                                                          
1
 In contrast, a number of organized interests are known best for their outsider reputations as either 
dissidents or non-specialists.  “These groups appear to contribute little of direct value to specific policy 
decisions because the costs of making their proposed policy changes are very high” (Browne, 1989).     
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Social network analysis studies the behavior of individual actors at the micro level, the pattern 
of relationships at the macro level, and the interaction between the micro and macro levels 
(Stokman, 2004). Networks facilitate information transmission (Granovetter, 1973) and assist in 
providing cooperation and collective action (Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000).  
There are two fundamental threads to analyzing power or influence in terms of a lobbying 
network. First, the network itself represents a macro-level picture of the influence of lobbyists 
on political or policy activity. An extremely dense network structure may provide the potential 
for great power, while a more loosely coupled structure will be less likely to provide the 
foundation from which to exert significant influence (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). Second, the 
power of the overall network can be distributed amongst its component parts in a variety of 
ways. This micro-level distribution of power is concentrated in the relational space between 
particular actors within the system, and can be more or less equally distributed (Hanneman and 
Riddle, 2005). In social network theory, these two related, but distinct threads are captured by 
the concept of “embeddedness”.  
The embeddedness perspective in network analysis “stresses the role of concrete personal 
relations and structures (or ‘networks’) of such relations in generating trust and discouraging 
malfeasance” (Granovetter 1985: 490).  “’Embeddedness’ refers to the fact that economic 
action and outcomes, like all social action and outcomes, are affected by actors’ dyadic (pair-
wise) relations and by the structure of the overall network of relations.”  (Granovetter 1992: 
34).  The micro-level concept of embeddedness emphasizes the dyadic or relational properties 
of the network. Reciprocating ties are generally asymmetric, differing in content and intensity, 
but ties are usually reciprocated in a generalized way (Wellman 1988).  Ties link network 
members indirectly as well as directly such that any tie between two actors must be defined 
within the context of the overall network.
2
   
Relational embeddedness typically has direct effects on individual action and leads to trust.  
Information from a trusted source is cheaper, richer, more detailed, and known to be accurate 
precisely because continuing relations often become overlaid with social content that carries 
strong expectations of trust and abstention from opportunism (Granovetter 1985).  Embedded 
exchanges make expectations more predictable and reduce monitoring costs, They also allow 
‘thick’ information exchange of tacit and proprietary know-how, and joint problem-solving 
arrangements that stress flexibility and feedback (Uzzi 1997).   
In contrast, macro-level structural embeddedness typically has more subtle and less direct 
effects on action.  Multiple independent paths that link pairs of structurally cohesive actors 
help information flow among organizations in a way that facilitates politically similar activity 
(Moody and White 2003).
3
  Structural embeddedness, which arises from sharing one or more 
foci of activity with others, is less under the control of individuals and is more stable than the 
dyad (Feld 1997). 
                                                          
2
 “In practice, many ties are with network members whom one does not like and with whom one would not 
voluntarily form a twosome.  Such ties are involuntary in that they come as part of the network membership 
package” (Wellman 1988: 41). 
3
 “In saying this I draw on the principle that to the extent that a dyad’s mutual contacts are connected to one 
another, there is more efficient information spread about what members of the pair are doing, and thus better 
ability to shape that behavior.  Such cohesive groups are better not only at spreading information, but also at 
generating normative, symbolic, and cultural structures that affect our behavior” (Granovetter 1992: 35).   
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Our Arguments   
Interest group communities are diverse and dynamic, exhibiting flows of people and 
organizations.  Within this fluid environment, we argue that a policy community is partly 
characterized by durable and informal relationships of participating lobbying organizations, but 
the strength of the relationship is a property of the group rather than the constituent 
organizations (Moody and White 2003).  Lobbying organizations will vary in terms of their 
specific strength of ties to each other, but the group has a unique level of cohesion that should 
persist over time.   
Moreover, relationships arise out of shared needs to find reputable services, information 
and key resources.  These needs contribute to an increasing level of group-wide relationships as 
reputations develop and spread in a way that fosters ties between entities.  Markovsky and 
Lawler (1994) identify ‘reachability’ as an essential idea to group embeddedness, meaning that 
we should be able to trace an actual path from one group member to any other member.  As 
new relations develop out of shared interests, multiple and independent paths between two 
lobbyists can be traced through the group (Moody and White 2003).   
But relations might only exist at one point in time:  For example, lobbyists might come 
together once, and only once, to discuss five legislative areas of interest, and then depart.  
Therefore, time also becomes part of the equation.  When we see the same lobbyists working 
together over time, we could say that they occupy a set of positions within a web of close-knit 
relationships.  Therefore, we would expect that those lobbyists and principals who operate in a 
policy community over time would increasingly develop a stable set of shared interests with 
other, similarly situated entities relative to those who do not work consistently in a policy area 
over time.  Moreover, people often know each other, but when they do not, they search for 
reliable markers of quality (Spence 1976; Podolny 1993) that will provide some assurance that 
the relationship or exchange will be beneficial rather than harmful, that the relationship will 
continue into the future (Hardin 2002). 
With these perspectives in mind, we will test the following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1: In a dynamic policy environment, long term participants in a policy community 
are more likely to create relationships with each other than with relative newcomers 
 
Hypothesis 2: In a dynamic policy environment, relationships are more likely to be higher for 
entities that have higher reputations for trust and/or ability. 
 
Data and Methods 
Because our focus is on relations within a community of policy actors, we rely primarily on 
social network concepts and methods.  Statistical procedures are used to assess the significance 
of associations, and we use a new modeling method for longitudinal network data.  In using 
different  methods, we hope to provide as complete a picture of a state-level lobbying 
community as the limited data will allow.  
In addition, the data is multilevel in nature. We have data on principal organizations 
(organizations that hire or employ lobbyists), lobbying organizations (organizations that hire 
themselves to principals or that are self-representing), and individual lobbyists.  The long-term 
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aim of this project is to assess the community of lobbying in North Carolina on each of these 
levels.   
Our primary data source is mandatory lobbyist registration information collected and 
maintained by the Office of the North Carolina Secretary of State.  Lobbyists – individuals and 
organizations – are required to register with the Secretary of State and file periodic reports.  
Periodic reports must identify clients that hire lobbyists.  These reports are publicly available,
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but they do require data manipulation and recoding.  Reports were downloaded for the 
following time periods: the two year periods of 1993-94; 1995-96; 1997-98; 1999-00; 2001-02; 
2003-04; 2005-06. Beginning in 2007, reporting requirements switched to annual reporting 
such that we have data for 2007 and 2008.
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Since the 1980s, the North Carolina Center for Public Policy Research (NCCPPR) has polled 
members of the legislature and the lobbying community as to the most influential individual 
lobbyists.  An example illuminates the process. For the 2004-05 legislative session, NCCPPR 
conducted the survey during the first three months of 2006.  All 50 state senators and 120 state 
representatives, 442 registered lobbyists (including the lead state agency legislative liasons), 
and 16 state capital news correspondents were asked to choose the top ten most influential 
lobbyists during the prior two-year session from a list of all registered lobbyists. The overall 
response rate was 48%, though there was wide divergence in the response rate of different 
groups: 68% of representatives; 72% of senators; 39% of lobbyists; and 63% of news 
correspondents responded that year. There is no publicly available data on the distribution of 
the respondents compared to the overall sample. The rankings are calculated by aggregating 
the number of times each lobbyist is listed as amongst the top ten and then constructing a list 
of the top 50 individuals ranked in terms of perceived influence.   
We use this data from 1993 to 2007 to construct a measure of a lobbying organization’s 
reputation for influence during each two-year legislative session.  First, we construct a total 
influence variable by reversing the coding such that the scales are reversed – the number 1 
lobbyist is coded as a ‘50’ and the 50
th
 ranked lobbyist is coded as a ‘1’.  In this way each 
lobbyist is rated on a point scale from 1 to 50 with 50 representing the most influential lobbyist.  
Each individual lobbyist’s ranking is attributed to the organization that employs him and if an 
organization has more than one influential lobbyist, the scores are added together.  
In terms of analysis, we first provide descriptive statistics for the different lobbying entities 
in North Carolina, including an exposition of the nature and structure of lobbying relations at 
the organizational and individual levels.  Social network analysis will also be used to illustrate 
the pattern of relations among lobbyists, among principals.   
Because we have longitudinal social network data, we use the “actor-oriented” statistical 
network model as expressed in the software program SIENA
6
 (Simulation Investigation for 
Empirical Network Analysis), which was developed to describe and explain the development of 
closed networks over time (Snijders, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2005; Snijders & Van Duijn, 1997).  The 
                                                          
4
 http://www.secretary.state.nc.us/lobbyists/thepage.aspx.  
5
 We understand that the time periods do not completely match up in terms of duration, and we hope to remedy 
this disjuncture in future iterations of the project. However, we do not believe that different durations detracts 
from the main points of this paper. 
6
 A free copy of the latest version is now available in R and from the website at http://stat.gamma.rug.nl/siena.html. 
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model evaluates the changes in the networks as a result of the rational actions of the lobbying 
organizations.  
Each actor maximizes a utility function based on substantive arguments and constructed 
such that it represents the costs and rewards for an actor to be in a specific state (e.g., creating 
or dissolving a tie) at a moment in time.  The individual utility function is modeled as a random 
component because it includes elements that are not represented in the model by measured 
variables. Therefore, the utility function contains statistical parameters that have to be 
estimated from real observed data.  
For each actor, a set of admissible actions is defined in that lobbying organizations may 
start, consolidate, or dissolve a tie to another organization. Actors only control their own 
decisions to create or dissolve links and do not force other actors to change their links.  In 
general, the choice of action for actor i at time = t, ait, is based on a number of independent 
variables. If an action can be described as a function of one or more substantive utility 
arguments, it is assumed that the actor is able to determine the expected effects of future 
actions.  Therefore, each decision is associated with a change in utility, ΔUit(a). Because the 
choice of action can also be based on utility arguments that are not explicitly modeled in the 
utility function and because of measurement and/or specification errors, it is assumed that ego 
chooses the action that maximizes ΔUit(a) + Eit(a), in which Eit(a) is random error term.  Under 
certain conditions on the distribution of Eit(a), this leads to the model: 
 
Pit =         exp(ΔUit(a)/σ) 
Σ
A
a=1 exp(ΔUit(a)/σ) 
 
This model states that in cases in which the expected change in utility is approximately the 
same for all actions ego’s choice is more or less entirely based on pure chance. However, if, 
compared to other actions, one action is associated with a relatively large increase of expected 
utility, the probability that ego chooses this specific action is also relatively large.  
In summary, we observe the networks of lobbying entities at different points in time and 
collect information regarding a number of fixed and varying individual and dyadic attributes. 
However, because we have no information about what happens between observations, the 
model simulates what happens in between the observation points using the random utility 
model. The organizational actions that make the network develop from one structure into 
another are the core of the simulation procedure.
7
  
SIENA estimates the model based on a maximum likelihood estimator using the method of 
moments, implemented as a continuous-time Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation. The model 
first calculates likely starting values for the parameters of all the variables. SIENA next simulates 
the choice process based on the starting values, compares the resultant simulated network 
with the observed networks of actual ties, and adjusts values to reduce differences between 
the observed and the simulated data.  The model then uses a number of simulations to 
determine the frequency distribution of predictions, which then are used to calculate standard 
errors for the final parameter values. 
                                                          
7
 The software that is used for the estimation is called SIENA, which is part of the network software package 
STOCNET and can be downloaded for free from http://stat.gamma.rug.nl/siena.html.  
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In this model, we examine the changes in ties between principals and individual lobbyists 
for 3 time periods (1993-4, 1995-6, 1997-8).  Because the modeling process is computationally 
intensive, we limit the analysis to the set of individual lobbyists who are consistent players in 
the policy community in at least 7 of the 8 total time periods.   
While we tried a number of parameters, including betweeness centrality, cycles of relations, 
and outdegrees, the model converged best when using four parameters (in addition to the 
standard density parameter that must always be included): the ‘popularity’ of the individual 
lobbyist as shown by his or her indegrees, an assortativity effect in which high outdegree 
principals are tied to high indegree lobbyists, the number of time periods that a principal is 
represented by lobbyists, and the reputation of the individual lobbyist as evidenced by being 
named as influential in a particular time period. 
In terms of the hypotheses, we would expect that positive and significant results for the 
number of time periods for principals would provide evidence for hypothesis 1.  That is, ties are 
more likely to be formed between long-term player-principals and long-term lobbyists.  For 
hypothesis 2, we expect that lobbyists with lots of indegrees and/or that have reputations as 
influential have the requisite markers of quality that will attract principals.  Moreover, the 
assortativity effect means that high outdegree principals are more likely to form relations with 
high indegree lobbyists.  In this way, we are assuming that higher numbers of degrees or ties 
are indicators of quality such that principals and lobbyists with similar numbers of ties will seek 
each other out. 
However, both hypotheses assume a crowded and dynamic policy environment.  Therefore 
the first part of our analysis describes the interest group environment in North Carolina. 
 
Analysis 
 
Lobbying in North Carolina 
We first provide some numerical and graphical representations of the networks of lobbying 
firms and hiring principals in North Carolina.  Figure 1 below shows over time trends in terms of 
the number of organizations and persons lobbying in North Carolina.  Whether individuals, 
lobbying organizations, or principals, we are seeing large and increasing numbers at each level 
although the number of lobbying organizations has shown more fluctuation. 
However, these numbers do not adequately describe the entire lobbying environment so 
we next discuss each level in more detail. 
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Figure 1: Number of Individual Lobbyists, Lobbying Organizations, and Principals in North 
Carolina, 1993-2006 
 
 
Individual Lobbyists 
 
Table 1 below indicates the total number of individual lobbyists over all time periods.  A 
relatively small number of individuals are consistent players in the lobbying world as only 113 
or 4.6 percent have lobbied in all 8 time periods.  The vast majority of individual lobbyists only 
do this kind of work for one legislative session.  Thus, we see a lot of movement in and out of 
the lobbying community over time. 
 
Table 1: Number and Percentage of Individual Lobbyists by Time Periods Spent Lobbying 
Time Periods Number Percentage 
1 1,298 52.81 
2 470 19.12 
3 241 9.8 
4 127 5.17 
5 97 3.95 
6 72 2.93 
7 40 1.63 
8 113 4.6 
 
In Figure 2 below, we see a network map of individual lobbyists who are affiliated to each 
other via common principals in 2007-08.  Components are color-coded, and one can see a giant 
component in red with a large number of small components scattered throughout.  This is a 
common pattern across time as the number of individuals belonging to the main component 
has fluctuated from 42 to 49 percent since 1993. 
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Figure 2: Network of Individual Lobbyists Affiliated through Principals, 2007-08 
 
 
 
From Figure 3, we can see that the average number of ties per individual lobbyist is small, 
fluctuating between 2 and 2.5, although the trend is on increasing ties over time.  This suggests 
that perhaps a relative few lobbyists have a large number of ties and many individual lobbyists 
have 1 or 2 ties to principals.   
 
Figure 3: Number of Individual Lobbyists and Average Indegree Per Time 
Period, 1993 through 2006. 
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Lobbying Organizations 
In terms of numbers, our data includes 2,624 organizations that lobbied or were 
represented by lobbying organizations in North Carolina over the 1993 through 2008 time 
period.  Of these, 2,292 were principals and 1,129 were lobbying organizations.  The reason 
that the number of principals and the number of lobbying organizations collectively are larger 
than for the entire dataset is that many organizations have, at one time or another, been both 
principals and lobbying organizations.  In total, 797 organizations have been in both categories 
(although not necessarily at the same time). 
But how does multilevel lobbying fit into the structure of the North Carolina interest group 
community?  To answer this question, we first consider the role of time.  For organizations in 
North Carolina, the distribution reflects a large number of organizations that are active for a 
short period of time but with a significant number of groups that operate across all time 
periods.     
 
Figure 4: Number of Lobbying Organizations by Number of Time Periods Represented in 
North Carolina (1993-2008)(n=1,129) 
 
 
What we can see from the distribution in the table is that organizations can be 
characterized generally as either repeat players or one-shot players (Galanter, 1974).   
With these characteristics of the lobbying community in mind, we now consider the overall 
shape of the network. Table 2 below provides a different set of cross-tabulations, this time 
between time spent lobbying in North Carolina and the number of times that an organization 
was selected as influential.  To be clear, this reflects the mere selection for being influential, not 
the relative ranking of influence.   The table shows that most organizations (91.2 percent) are 
never chosen as influential.  Of those organizations chosen as influential, the distribution 
appears bimodal: Many organizations are consistently influential, and many are influential only 
one or two times.  Time, of course is an important factor—an organization cannot not be 
influential if it is not actively involved in advocacy.  But it is striking that a small subset, about 2 
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percent of lobbying organizations, are consistently viewed as influential in North Carolina 
politics. 
 
Table 2: Tabulation of Time Periods Lobbying in North Carolina and Influence Rankings, in 
percentages (1993-2008)(n=1,119) 
 
Number of Times Chosen as Influential 
 Time in 
NC 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total 
1 27.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.7 
2 17.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.4 
3 9.8 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.6 
4 5.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.7 
5 7.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 
6 5.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.5 
7 4.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 5.1 
8 4.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 4.6 
9 10.8 1.3 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 1.0 0.8 16.2 
Total 91.2 3.0 1.6 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.2 0.8 100.0 
 
First, we note that the presence of a giant component is not restricted to one time period.  
Table 3 summarizes the size of the giant component over time.  Generally 60 percent of 
lobbying organizations active in any particular year are members of the main or giant 
component. 
 
Table 3: Organizations in Main Network Componet, 1993-2008 (frequency and percent) 
Time Periods 
93-94 95-96 97-98 99-00 01-02 03-04 05-06 07 08 
Number  of Orgs in 
Main Component 443 545 565 538 602 500 610 557 497 
All Organizations 735 827 888 831 868 827 972 974 887 
Pct in Main Component 60.3% 65.9% 63.6% 64.7% 69.4% 60.5% 62.8% 57.2% 56.0% 
 
 
What is holding this main component together?  In Figure 5 below, we show the average 
number of in-degrees (normalized to reflect the variations in the networks over time) for for-
hire lobbying organizations over the entire time period of the data.  The general trend is of an 
increase in the average number of in-degrees held by these for-hire lobbying firms.  In other 
words, relations may be concentrating within a small group of organizations. 
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Figure 5: Average In-Degrees Per For-Hire Lobbying Organization, 1993-2008 (n=450) 
 
 
 
Principals 
 
The last group that we review is principals, which are those entities that either hire 
lobbyists.  Figure 6 below provides a graphical breakdown of the percentage of principals in 
each legislative session by number of time periods that they support lobbying activities.  The 
top group in the figure are principals that are involved in all time periods considered in this 
study.  In general, this group of long-term principals account with some variation for a third of 
all principals in any one time period.  At the other end of the spectrum are principals that are 
active for very short time periods.  Those principals that are only active for 1 or 2 legislative 
sessions make up approximately 30 percent of all principals in any one time period.  Much like 
the environment for individual and organizational lobbyists, the policy environment for 
principals can be characterized as dynamic. 
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Figure 6: Distribution of Total Lobbying Time of Principal Organizations by Legislative Session 
 
 
Figure 7 indicates that despite the fairly dynamic nature of the principals community, the 
vast majority of principals are connected to each other, based on common affiliations with 
individual lobbyists, as approximately 85 percent belong to the main component.  The other 
line in Figure 7 shows that the average degree of principals has fluctuated between 7 and 22 
degrees.  As Figure 1 above illustrated a sharp increase in the number of principals, the 
fluctuation may reflect the addition of new principals in more recent time periods. 
 
Figure 7: Average Degrees of Principals and Percent in Main Component, 1993-2006 
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The Distribution of Lobbying Relationships and Power Laws   
The foregoing discussion suggests a process of concentration occuring in the networks.  The 
fact that North Carolina lobbying has a substantial minority that are ‘repeat players’ and a large 
number that are ‘one-shot players’ (Galanter 1974-5) may translate into a particular 
distribution in the relationships among organizations.  Such a concentration of ties in a small 
group of entities may indicate the presence of a scale-free network or a structure of ties that is 
characterized by a power law distribution (Barabasi 1999; Aldrich and Kim 2007).  A power law 
distribution of ties is characterized by many organizations have few or no ties to others while a 
small minority have a large number of ties.  The network is therefore sparse in terms of its 
connections.  While there are different ways to check for power law distributions (see Barabasi 
et al. 2002), log-log plots of the distribution of ties or degrees in network parlance are often 
used to check for power law distributions.  If the general distribution of ties exhibits a fat right 
tail (e.g., many organizations with little or no ties to othes with a minority of organizations 
holding many ties to others), we would expect a power law distribution.  For example, Figure 8 
gives the in-degree distribution for the 2007-8 network.   
 
Figure 8: Kdensity Distribution of In-Degrees for the 2007-8 Lobbying Organizations 
 
Transforming the general distribution to logarithmic scales should convert the fat tail to a 
linear relationship.  Figure 9 provides log-log plots for the incoming ties to all North Carolina 
lobbying organizations for all years as well as for the distribution of the sum of ties across all 
years.  Each graph has a scatter of dots for the actual distribution as well as a line that is fitted 
for the distribution.  Looking at the individual years, some distributions exhibit a better fit to 
the power law distribution than others (such as the graph for 2007-8, which was the example 
network in Figures 4 through 8 above).  However, all graphs exhibit, to a greater or lesser 
degree, a power law distribution, and this is certainly true for the last graph, which is the sum 
of all in-coming ties across all years.   
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Figure 9: Log-Log Plots of In-Degree Distributions (Directed Ties) for North Carolina Lobbying 
Organizations, 1993-2008 
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A somewhat similar picture can be found at the individual lobbyist and principal levels.  
Figure 10a provides a log-log plot of the individual lobbyist indegree distribution for 1993 
through 2008, and Figure 10b shows the logged distribution of the total outdegrees for 
principals for 1993 through 2008.  
 
Figure 10a: Individual Lobbyists       Figure 10b: Principals 
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However, note that in many of the graphs in Figure 9 that the ‘tail’ of the distribution does 
not follow the fitted line all the way down to the x axis but rather curves down.  The scale-free 
quality of the network is truncated even in cases in which the actual values fit very well to the 
line.  This indicates that the best linked organizations are not getting all the links.  Kogut, Urso, 
and Walker (2007), writing in the context of the venture capital industry, suggest that actors in 
a truncated scale-free network may tend to recreate prior ties rather than link to the most 
linked actors.  Given the importance of trust in lobbying relationships, it is perhaps not 
surprising, then, that prior relationships might act as a break on the development of a pure 
scale-free network in an interest group community. 
Why is characterizing the network of lobbying organizations as scale-free important?  Such 
a characterization indicates a ‘winner-take-all’ quality to lobbying.  Certain organizations seem 
to garner the majority of business from principals.  As discussed in the conclusion, this has 
implications for the business of lobbying, representation, and influence.   
 
Results of Dynamic Modeling Analysis of “Long-Term” Individual Lobbyist-Principal Network:   
In this section we discuss changes in network structure over time with regard to the 
relationships between individual lobbyists and principals.  Because of the challenges of 
modeling large longitudinal networks, we limit the analysis in two ways.  First, we focus on only 
those individual lobbyists who are consistently registered as lobbyists, that is, registered for at 
least 7 out of 8 legislative sessions over the 1993-2008 time period.  Second, we consider only 3 
waves of data.  Below are Figures 11a through 11c, which are network maps of these 
relationships for 1993-4, 1995-6, and 1997-8.  In each figure, color indicates a component, and 
the size of the node indicates whether the individual lobbyist was listed as influential for that 
legislative session.   
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Figure 11a: 1993-4     Figure 11b: 1995-6 
   
 
Figure 11c: 1997-8 
 
 
 
The three figures provide a similar story.  In each network, there is a giant component in 
which the majority of individuals and principals are connected (in each case, the giant 
component is colored blue and can be seen as giant arc around the other components). 
Table 6 below presents the results of the dynamic modeling of the change in the network 
structure among long-term individual lobbyists (registered for at least 6 legislative sessions) and 
principal organizations that hire the lobbyists.  Because the model is computationally intensive, 
we have so far only modeled changes in network structure for three waves of data, which are 
the 1993-94, 1995-96, and 1997-98 legislative sessions.  As the data is directional in that a tie 
from a principal to a lobbyist indicates a hire, we are looking to see if changes in ties across the 
network reflect basic processes in lobbying relationships.  As discussed above, these processes 
include whether more ‘popular’ lobbyists attract more business, whether highly connected 
principals (with lots of outdegrees) tend to hire lobbyists with lots of indegrees (out-in 
assortativity), whether a lobbyist’s public reputation as influential is an attractor for principals, 
and whether higher outdegree principals tend to hire more lobbyists. 
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Table 4:  Parameter Estimates for Long-term Individual Lobbyists and Principals, 
1993-1998 (3 waves) 
Parameter Coefficient Standard Error t Value p Value 
     
Rate Parameter Period 1 0.287 0.025   
Rate Parameter Period 2 0.291 0.024   
     
Outdegree (density) -7.732 0.231 -33.472 <0.001 
Indegree (popularity) 0.060 0.027 2.222 0.077 
Out-In Degree Assortativity 0.575 0.088 6.534 0.001 
Influence of Alter 0.973 0.348 2.796 0.038 
Principals’ Total Time Lobbying 0.274 0.042 6.524 0.001 
     
n = 850     
 
The coefficients in Table 4 indicate changes in network ties for a change in the parameter, 
all other parameters held constant.  We find support for the hypothesized processes.  The 
‘popularity’ of individual lobbyists as shown in the number of indegrees does have a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient of 0.06, but this coefficient is relatively small and the 
significance is not very strong.  But it does suggest a process of high indegree lobbyists getting 
more business – The rich getting richer.   
The coefficient for out-in assortativity is 0.575 and is statistically significant.  Thus, 
principals with more outdegrees (that is, with many lobbying hires) are more likely to hire 
additional lobbyists with more indegrees.  So there is a bit of a homophily process in which high 
degree principals and lobbyist are attracted to each other.   
In addition, the influence alter coefficient is 0.973 and also significant.  Thus, lobbyists who 
have been recognized by their peers as influential are significantly more likely to attract 
principals than lobbyists who are not so recognized.   
Finally, the total time spent in the policy community by principals also shows positive and 
significant results with a coefficient of 0.274.  Recall that we only included individual lobbyists 
who were long-term players so these results indicate that long-term players, both principals 
and lobbyists, tend to create ties over time. 
 
Discussion  
This paper has shown some important features of the interest group community at the 
state level (at least for one state!).  First, all levels in the lobbying community – individuals, 
organizations, and principals – exhibit a dynamic environment that is generally becoming more 
numerous.   
We also found that the network of lobbying entities seems to exhibit scale-free properties 
at the state level.  That is, within the main component of the network in each time period, a 
small number of entities hold a disproportionate number of ties to other entities.  This finding 
seemed to appear in each time period at least for lobbying organizations.   
With this environment as a backdrop we argued that entities seeking to create relations and 
affiliations will look for markers of quality and trustworthiness.  In order to make an attempt at 
answering this question, we modeled the changes in a network of long-term individual lobbyists 
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and principals that hire them.  We found that high indgree lobbyists attracted ties in general, 
that high degree lobbyists and principals tended to attract to one another, that long-term 
principals created ties, and that lobbyists publicly identified as influential attract ties.  We think 
that these results suggest that in entities looking to influence policy through working with 
others look for signals of reliability.   
However, these results are preliminary.  There are a number of unfinished tasks associated 
with this project.  We intend to continue collecting data and coding additional variables that 
can augment the analysis presented here.  For example, we would like better organizational 
and interest attributes.  Moreover, we will extend this work to principal organizations and 
individual lobbyists.  In addition, a goal of this project will be to continue to explore how the 
structure of relationships changes over time.  Finally, we intend to collect data from other 
states in order to see whether the findings in this paper can be generalized. 
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